• Rep. Paul Ryan (WI)
• Rep. Dave Camp (MI)
• Rep. Jeb Hensarling (TX)
• Sen. Judd Gregg (NH)
• Sen. Michael Crapo (ID)
• Sen. Tom Coburn

With the possible exception of Coburn, this list was predictable.  It includes the senior GOP members of the House and Senate Budget Committees and the House Ways and Means Committee.  Crapo is six down from the top of the Senate Finance Committee and Senate Republican leader Mith McConnell (KY) had to skip over two comparative moderates -- ranking member Chuck Grassley (IA) and Olympia Snowe (ME) -- to get to him, but he's also on budget.   Coburn is not a member of budget, finance, or appropriations, but he is a gadfly (read: pain in the ass) when it comes to spending and can be expected to talk about earmarks and pork at every possible opportunity.

• Honeywell International Inc. Chief Executive Officer David Cote
• Former Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Alice Rivlin
• Andy Stern, president of the Service Employees International Union
• Former Young & Rubicam Brands CEO Ann Fudge

An interesting group in many ways.  Other than Rivlin, no budget people and a strong outsider feel.

We're still waiting to see which three House Democrats Nancy Pelosi names and whether House and Senate Republicans select anyone.

• Majority Whip Dick Durbin of Illinois
• Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus of Montana
• Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad of North Dakota

These were the logical choices.

My column from today's Roll Call is really a letter to the budget commission created by the president last Thursday.

Budget Commission First Needs to Answer Big-Picture Questions

Feb. 23, 2010

I told the House Rules Committee several years ago that it shouldn’t bother to come up with a new Congressional budget process until it knew what it wanted that process to accomplish. All of the other witnesses at the hearing had specific recommendations. But, much to the frustration of several Members, I testified as forcefully as I could that it wasn’t worth their time, effort or energy to propose a new budget process until there was a consensus at least in the committee about what needed to be done. Without that, even if it could be enacted (which I said I doubted), a new budget process was doomed to fail so there was no reason to bother.

Republican leaders not only still haven't said whether they will name any House and Senate members to fill the six GOP slots on the presidential deficit reduction commission (formally, the "National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform") that will be created today; they have given every indication that they won't do it.

Their thinking seems to be: The commission might recommend that taxes be increased, we're against all tax increases, so we won't participate.

Note that the word is "might," and not "will," "should," or "must," raise taxes.

What does the 53-46 vote mean for the prospects of deficit reduction?

The short answer is nothing good.

That doesn't mean that the prospects would have been much better had the amendment been adopted and the commission created.  It just means we now have a pretty good indication of what the politics of deficit reduction is at the moment.

And it's ugly.

Although some will try to make a big deal about the fact that the amendment received 53 out of 99 votes and, therefore, got a majority, that argument doesn't really fly in a world where the U.S. needs 60 votes to do almost anything and less than a super majority gets you nothing.  This is especially the case on budget issues.   You can say that Conrad and Gregg made a good effort.  But the amendment was defeated.

The defeat was absolutely bipartisan: 22 Democrats plus Independent Bernie Sanders (VT) and 23 Republicans voted against it.  Here's the list of the nays from The Library of Congress' Thomas:

I know and admire Diane Lim Rogers.  She's a friend, colleague, and frequent co- conspirator when it comes to budget.  But Brad DeLong has her number with this post: No Diane, having any budget commission is not necessarily better than not having one.

I truly wish this wasn't the case.  But when, as Brad points out, a commission is really just an excuse to do less now and a subterfuge for what's really happening, I don't see the value.  Given all the failed budget commissions and summits of the past and the fact that the moon and stars don't seem to be in proper alignment for one to succeed now, I'd much rather have members of Congress take their lumps at the next election for not using the power they already have to deal with the deficit than to promise for no apparent reason that somehow a commission is going to be different this time.

For those of us old enough to remember (I'll include Bruce and Pete in that group, I'm pretty sure Troy and Andrew don't qualify, and I'm not sure about Ed), all of the talk about how best to set up a commission doesn't seem to be that different from the torturous negotiations that held up any serious work at the Vietnam peace talks. 

Then, instead of talking about ending the hostilities, the initial talks were about the size and shape of the table the negotiators were going to use. 

Now, instead of talking about the budget, the discussion is about the size and shape of the commission.

What's next?  Will Henry Kissinger be one of the budget commission chairs?

I've re-read Keith Hennessey's take on the supposed differences between the reported (he uses the worded "rumored;" given that it's actually been reported in news sources and already denounced by some Republicans, that's clearly wrong) administration proposal to create a budget commission by executive order and the Conrad-Gregg proposal to create one legislatively. 

Never mind that fact that the commission Keith puts on a pedestal as a shining example of what can be accomplished -- the Greenspan Commission on Social Security -- failed...miserably.

Let's forget about the fact that the Greenspan Commission was created in the way Keith says is less effective -- by executive order rather than legislatively.

Also...We should ignore the fact that the Greenspan Commission didn't include one of the things Hennessey says is so needed: a guarantee that Congress would take up the recommendations if there are any.

Other than than, his arguments make little or no sense.

What is most commonly known as The Greenspan Commission -- the group created by Ronald Reagan to deal with Social Security that was chaired by Alan Greenspan long before he became chairman of the Federal Reserve Board -- is generally thought to be the prototype for federal commissions because it supposedly succeeded in dealing with an otherwise politically intractable economic issue.

Except that it didn't.