Vehemently Disagreeing With Keith Hennessey
I've re-read Keith Hennessey's take on the supposed differences between the reported (he uses the worded "rumored;" given that it's actually been reported in news sources and already denounced by some Republicans, that's clearly wrong) administration proposal to create a budget commission by executive order and the Conrad-Gregg proposal to create one legislatively.
Never mind that fact that the commission Keith puts on a pedestal as a shining example of what can be accomplished -- the Greenspan Commission on Social Security -- failed...miserably.
Let's forget about the fact that the Greenspan Commission was created in the way Keith says is less effective -- by executive order rather than legislatively.
Also...We should ignore the fact that the Greenspan Commission didn't include one of the things Hennessey says is so needed: a guarantee that Congress would take up the recommendations if there are any.
Other than than, his arguments make little or no sense.
First, it should be obvious that the Conrad-Gregg proposal is not simply the delegation of the details he says it is: it's clearly an attempt to duck responsibility for coming up with a deficit reduction plan by people who currently already have the power to do just that and refuse to use it.
Second, how can you possibly say, as Keith does, that the Conrad-Gregg proposed commission is an attempt "to delegate control to change the law"? What law? There is no consensus at all about what should be done to reduce the deficit so what exactly is being delegated to this commission?
And it's not at all clear that Congress has the authority to delegate that responsibility any way or that we should let the people who have been elected to make changes in law delegate it to someone else.
Contrary to what Keith says, no matter how it is created, the budget commissions being discussed absolutely would be different from the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. BRAC started with a mandate to propose DOD facility closures and just had to decide which ones. As Hennessey himself points out, the Conrad-Gregg commission wouldn't even start with a consensus such as how fast the deficit should be eliminated let alone something more specific like which tax and spending provisions should be changed to increase revenues or reduce outlays.
Third, Keith says "A commission ... must have formal authority to bind policymakers." He should know better; under the U.S. Constitution that's not possible. Congress can always change an existing law if it chooses to do so. It can also simply not follow its own rules. It's not at all hard to imagine a situation where the House and Senate in some way actually votes against proceeding to consideration the bill with the commission's recommendations because it included one or more things the representatives and senators thought politically obnoxious and harmful. After all, the recommendations could include spending cuts and revenue increases.
Fourth, he's totally disingenuous about the question of partisan balance of the commission membership. He lists on his table "12 appointed by D's" but completely fails to say that, of the 6 that are not House or Senate members, 2 specifically could not be Democrats. The final ratio of 10 Democrats to 8 Republicans would be precisely the same as what's proposed by the Conrad-Gregg commission.
Fifth, Keith doesn't like the plan for the administration's proposed commission of reducing the deficit to 3 percent of GDP by 2015 but thinks that the incredibly general "significantly improve the long-term fiscal imbalance" of the Conrad-Gregg commission would somehow be better. But we know from BRAC that commissions work best, or only work, when the charge is as specific as possible rather than as nebulous as can be.
There's more, but this is enough to show that Hennessey seems to have written his analysis backwards. I can't help but come to the conclusion that Keith started with the result he wanted to reach -- that a the proposal the GOP wants is somehow better -- and then tried to develop arguments to prove it.
He failed.
Greenspan's and other commissions
I fully agree with you (and Bruce) in believing nothing particulary good would come from any budget commission today -- the motivation for having one being expedient politics for those behind the proposals, help in avoiding making painful decisions rather than in actually making them.
That said, I don't understand the hostility to the Greenspan Commission.
"the commission Keith puts on a pedestal as a shining example of what can be accomplished -- the Greenspan Commission on Social Security -- failed...miserably."
Hennessey's entire reference to the Greenspan Commission was ...
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In my experience, there are four reasons to create a commission:
1...
2. You want to create an external credible body of “wise men” to produce consensus recommendations to build broader political support for politically painful policy changes: 1982 Social Security Commission.
3...
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That is all. He doesn't even say anything good about it. Where's the pedestal?
More substantively, the purpose of the Greenspan Commission was to come up with ideas that could be used to close the imminent SS funding gap -- and more importantly, as the Times story says, to give the political leaders cover to make a deal, helping them to escape the enforced paralysis that resulted as long as partisan fire from Republicans kept taxes from being increased and from Democrats kept benefits from being cut.
Well, the political leaders made a deal using ideas from the Commission (plus some more). And more importantly, they got the political cover they needed, plus a lot of political support from moderates who respect bipartisan commissions, so they could make their deal without being lambasted by their own partisans -- and could even make a deal at all.
The fact that to this day it is called the "bipartisan Greenspan Commission fix", instead of the "Reagan/Republican Social Security benefit cuts" plus "O'Neill/Democrat tax increases" (or vice versa, depending on who is throwing the stones) seems to me evidence that it was a pretty good success on that score.
To say the commission "failed miserably" is to say that it provided no benefit, was worthless (or even made things worse).
But would O'Neill have been able to tell his liberal base he was agreeing to cut SS benefits, and get it by them as easily but for the commission? And would Reagan have gotten tax increases past his base so easily? Did not all those wise men's names (like Ball's) carry value with public opinion and voters? (Didn't Ball's signing on help mute criticism from the left base? Maybe George was too modest about his own value.) IMHO the commission had a good deal of value to them for that.
Their actions would seem to indicate that too -- or why would they have pushed so hard at the end to get the commission to come up with a formal recommendation, when it was on the verge of breaking up? Quoting the story:
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... Mr. Baker’s deputy, Richard Darman, called Mr. Ball and asked, “Can we have a meeting that never took place?”
Their rendezvous gave rise to others at Mr. Baker’s house and at Blair House, the government guesthouse near the White House.
Four top administration officials, led by Mr. Baker, met with five of the commission’s most pragmatic members — Mr. Ball and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York for the Democrats, and for the Republicans, Mr. Greenspan, Senator Robert J. Dole of Kansas and Representative Barber B. Conable Jr. of New York.
Mr. Reagan extended the commission’s life by two weeks to Jan. 15 ... When word leaked and reporters staked out his house before one session, Mr. Ball sneaked out the rear and slid down a hill to a car sent by the White House.
The group reached agreement late on Jan. 15, a Saturday, and secured support from a commission majority only with White House arm-twisting...
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That's a lot of effort and arm-twisting to get something of no value to them! To me it indicates Ron and Tip put a lot of value on getting that commission majority agreement.
OK, if the measure of "success" is having commission members platonically ponder best solutions to a problem, with no partisans politics or delay, then deliver what they impartially agree upon to the political power holders, who say "Thanks, we'll do whatever you said, we trusted you", the commission was an abject failure. But in what world do negotiations work like that?
Of course the leaders, Ron and Tip, had to have the will to make a hard, painful, deal at the last minute. But they also had to have the political ability to make it, and most certainly wanted to make the deal as "least hard" for themselves as possible.
It's the same thing with every labor negotiation that goes down to the last minute replete with advisory studies for both sides, that the settling leaders use to tell their own people this is a deal they should settle for, with impartial outsiders reinforcing the message. It really helps.
Now today is very different. We aren't anywhere near the "last minute" on a budget crisis like SS was in 1982, so no political leader on either side is being driven by unavoidable necessity to make any hard, painful decisions about it (and none certainly are volunteering for the pain).
So a commission won't help them do what they're not doing and don't intend to do. It will have other purposes of self-interested politics.
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I can't help but come to the conclusion that Keith started with the result he wanted to reach -- that a the proposal the GOP wants is somehow better
For all my skepticism of Conrad-Gregg, if it is so partisanly Republican why is the first name on it that of the Democratic Senate Budget Committee Chairman?
Jim, Your argument fits my
Jim,
Your argument fits my point at http://capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/stan-collender/1414/greenspan-commi... (second paragraph) that, even if a side-deal represented the breakthrough, we cannot simply presume that the Greenspan commission was necessarily not instrumental nevertheless*. There are a number of ways in which the commission could have been instrumental (or at least conducive) to that side-deal and to its enactment, most notably by providing political cover as well as sorting out the issue, some potential solutions, and practical and political constraints.
As for a budget commission today of the Gregg-Conrad variety or better, the odds may indeed be against some bold, sweeping “grand compromise” recommendation emerging from the commission, being enacted and being implemented, but as I’ve explained previously on this blog, considering all the ways, direct and indirect, in which such a commission could get us to at least a relatively small degree of fiscal responsibility somewhat sooner than otherwise, it’s hard to see how it’s not worth doing, considering the various potential outcomes and their respective probabilities. Other than having the objective of holding out for a better commission, the only cause for opposition I can (and do) see is apparently if one attaches overwhelming weight to his emotion-driven desire to prevent some politicians from getting away with faking fiscal responsibility for about a year (and/or one's professional interest in ridiculing the commission concept).
By the way, if -- just hypothetically -- you thought such a commission were likely to succeed in recommending and achieving enactment of a combination of substantial cuts in projected spending and substantial tax increases, would you oppose such a commission?
* I’m reminded of the old story of the guy who is asked which is more important, the sun or the moon. He replies, “The moon, of course! The sun gives off light during the daytime when we don’t need it, but the moon provides some light at night!”
Actually, you're the one
Actually, you're the one being disingenuous about the partisan makeup of the Obama panel. Obama gets to appoint 2 of the 8 Repubs, and he no doubt would be pick the most liberal ones he could find so that he would have 2 of the 4 Repub votes he needs to enact massive tax hikes. With 14/18 needed to approve the recommendation, he just needs 2 of the remaining 6 to sign on. With a couple of moderates on the panel (McCain, Collins, Snowe, Gred, Lugar, Voinovich)... this easily result in massive tax hikes with only enough spending cuts to make these Rinos feel good about themselves.