StanCollender'sCapitalGainsandGames Washington, Wall Street and Everything in Between



What Broke Congress?

01 Mar 2010
Posted by Bruce Bartlett

David Frum has a good post today on how the reforms of the 1970s that were supposed to make Congress work better actually destroyed its ability to function. While I don't disagree with David's specific points, I think he is ignoring the proverbial elephant in the living room: the demise of the conservative Southern Democrat.

It is becoming clearer and clearer with the passage of time that the period from 1938 to 1974 was unique in American political history. We all know that the Civil War made the South solidly Democratic, or perhaps more precisely anti-Republican. Republicans were, of course, the party of abolition and the hated Abraham Lincoln, and the Democratic Party was the beneficiary of this hatred.

But something curious happened in 1938. Franklin Roosevelt, flush from his enormous victory in 1936, was annoyed by the lack of enthusiasm many Southern Democrats had for the New Deal and he attempted to purge some of them by promoting more liberal primary opponents.

Roosevelt's efforts failed completely. But they had an important consequence in hardening opposition to the New Deal among Southern Democrats, especially in the Senate. This melted historical antipathy between them and the Republicans. It also helped that many more Republicans were from the West rather than the North, and therefore had less attachment to issues related to the war. Moreover, race was much less of an issue in the West and Republicans from that region were more libertarian than those in the North and more willing to work with Southerners on things like the budget where they shared an antipathy for taxes and deficits.

After 1938, this coalition of Southern Democrats and Republicans essentially ran Congress. It got big boosts in 1946 and 1952 when Republicans briefly took control because all of the Democrats that lost were from outside the South. This meant that Southern Democrats gained seniority at the expense of more liberal Northern Democrats and got the chairmanship of many key committees, which they held for decades. We all remember from the battle for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s how important Southern control of the House Rules Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee were to that struggle.

Southern Democratic control of many congressional committees was central to Congress's ability to get things done during this era. Since Southern Democrats all had very safe seats they could often do what they thought was right even if it went against the interests of their constituents. And David is right that there were institutions in Congress that protected them as well, such as marking up bills in executive sessions.

But Watergate indirectly destroyed the Southern Democrats because it led to a historically huge victory by liberal Democrats in 1974. These newcomers quickly allied themselves with congressional reformers who had long chaffed at the power of the Neanderthal Southerners. After the election they moved swiftly to neuter the fundamental source of the Southerners' power: seniority. In the House, Bob Poage of Texas was removed as chairman of the Agriculture Committee, Edward Herbert of Louisiana was ousted as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Wright Patman of Texas was kicked out of the chairmanship of the Banking Committee, and Wilbur Mills of Arkansas was forced to cede the Ways and Means Committee chairmanship.

Many other reforms mentioned by David were also part of a concerted effort by liberals to break the power of the Southerners. But in the process, they destroyed any reason why a politically conservative Southerner would have for staying in the Democratic Party. Once Southern Democrats could no longer depend on seniority to automatically give them power there was simply no reason to remain Democrats except out of habit.

At the same time, the long legacy of the Civil War finally began to diminish hatred of the Republicans and the influx of blacks into Democratic primaries following the Voting Rights Act also began to push the conservatives out. Thus began the migration of conservatives out of the Democratic Party and into the Republican Party that culminated in the great Republican congressional victory of 1994.

Of course, there is much more that could be said on this subject. But I just wanted to make the point that Southern Democrats were central to making Congress work during the 36 years between 1938 and 1974. Their demise is a key reason why Congress no longer works because they were the essential bridge between the two parties that made bipartisanship possible. (The demise of the liberal Republican was also a factor, but that's another story.) Since the conservative Southern Democrat was the product of unique historical factors unlikely to ever be repeated, it's hard to see how the era in which Congress seemed to work can be recreated.

Addendum

Matt Yglesias comments here and has some good charts supporting my argument. Jonathan Bernstein comments here.

Unconvincing

So, (1) the main reason Congress worked during the period in question was because Southern Democratic politicians were able to attain such seniority, and therefore legislative power, that they could pursue the national interest first, rather than faithfully represent their constituencies. Today, stripped of seniority, southern politicians no longer feel free to pursue the national interest?

(2)So the political realignment of the South had primarily to do with the disaffection and then defection of senior southern democrats in a fit of pique over losing the prerogatives of seniority after 1974. It was the office holders not the electorate that initiated the realignment? This despite Lyndon Johnson's prediction that passing civil rights legislation in 1965 would lose Democrats the south for a generation, and Nixon's 1968 explicit strategy to exploit that tension?

Something tells me we need a much better explanation that this.


You are being far too kind to

You are being far too kind to the Republican Party by focusing on a "philosophical" basis for Southern politicians moving to the GOP. . . Ronald Reagan set the tone in 1980 by using the code words "states rights" which sent white voters to leave the Democratic Party. . . These voters are NOT conservative politically (most would be considered populist.) But, they are very conservative on social issues - especially race and religion. . . The Republican Party - over the past 30 years - has done a masterful job of engaging these socially conservative white voters. . . Going forward, it will be interesting to monitor whether the national party will be forced into being more populist politically by its Southern base. . .


why are blacks antithetical to conservatives?

Bruce Bartlett wrote: "the influx of blacks into Democratic primaries following the Voting Rights Act also began to push the conservatives out."

As Wisconsin Reader suggests, there are multiple ways to read this.

If "social conservative" isn't too far off from "cultural chauvisnist," then there's a very simple reason why conservatives can't abide being in the same party as a bunch of black people.

I've always thought that Lee Atwater had as good an explanation as any on the evolution of party allegiances and rhetoric over time; is there a better one around?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lee_Atwater#Atwater_on_the_Southern_Strategy


There are other angles. After

There are other angles. After surviving a challenge from the left in 1936, Roosevelt went back to fiscal austerity and caused a recession. This hurt him with everyone, especially the progressives, who were mostly but not only Republican, and who had supported the most liberal New Deal programs. The progressives also mostly opposed WWII. So past a certain point, for several reasons, FDR had no choice but to rely on Southern Democrats (and machine Democrats, who tended to be fairly conservative).

When Humphrey proposed a civil rights plank at the 1948 convention, he was basically proving himself to Minnesota's third party progressives, the radical Farmer Labor Party, which had just merged with the Democrats. Up until then the Minnesota Democrats had been insignificant, and always suspected of Copperhead or segregationist sympathies.

Not nly did the South briefly bolt for that reason, but so did northern progressives, who tended to be anti-war regardless and did not support the cold war. Truman won, Humphrey was on the winning side on both ssues, and in 1965--1968 it all came to a head with the civil rights acts and the Vietnam War. And that's all she wrote.... See More


Bruce, Any commentary on the

Bruce,

Any commentary on the role and impact of Nixon's "Southern Strategy"?


What really broke Congress

I believe that we broke Congress when we broke the link between population and the size of the House of Representatives. This happened a generation before the era you cite above, and we've had nearly a century of population growth without a corresponding increase in the size of the House.

In that time, our population has more than doubled, decreasing our representation (Representative/100,000 population) by more than half.

This has so many effects that it is no surprise that its importance has been hidden away. It is just assumed that there is nothing we can do about it.

In reality, the size of the House affects these things, and more: representation; population balance between the states in the Congress, which is already quite skewed in the Senate; the ability to run for office because of cost; the ability of corporations to coerce a small number of representatives; the balance of state power in the despised Electoral College; and many more.

If we greatly increased the size of the House (3-5X larger), it would become possible for regular people to run for a Congressional seat. The dollar barrier to entry would be much smaller. The representative would have to be more accountable to the constituency (i.e. the people), since they would be much easier to replace.

Of course, individual House members, outside of the leadership, would lose status. It would be much harder to enforce party discipline and there would be greater likelihood that alternate parties would be present. These are some of the reasons that you don't hear about this option.

And it is an option. The only thing it would to take to increase the size of the House is for Congress to do it. No amendments are necessary.

The census is coming. We can make this happen.


Congress

I have long lamented that the House froze its membership in 1913 and that the Senate ceased representing the state as states with the 17th amendment. But these two factors cannot possibly explain Congress's inability to simply function because that is something of fairly recent origin.


An alternative (at least a

An alternative (at least a step in the right direction) http://www.publicampaign.org/node/38166




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